Tag Archives: land use rights

Property rights, land values and urban development

Li, Tian (2014). Property rights, land values and urban development : betterment and compensation in China. Edward Elgar, 232 p. ISBN : 978-1-78347-639-8 (hardcover) / 978-1-78347-640-4 (ebook)

This book presents an analysis of betterment and compensation issues under the Land Use Rights (LURs) System in China since 1988. The topic originates from the observation of widening inequity and increasing uncertainty associated with the failure of government to adequately address betterment and compensation issues. An analytical framework of institutions and property rights is employed to examine socio-economic impacts under the LURs system, in particular, the role of the state is analyzed to explore the effects of government intervention in land markets.

Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Nature of land rent and land value capture
  3. Studying betterment and compensation from a perspective of property rights
  4. Assessing and addressing betterment and compensation: international experiences
  5. Urban land reform and evolution of land market in China
  6. Betterment and compensation schemes under the lurs system
  7. Assessing and addressing betterment and compensation in guangzhou: empirical evidence
  8. Institutional evolution in the land market of Guangzhou
  9. Conclusions
  10. Bibliography
  11. Index

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Monique Abud

Centre d’études sur la Chine moderne et contemporaine, EHESS, Paris, France

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Land expropriation in China

Zhang, Xian. Seeking just compensation for collective-owned land expropriation in China. Short Academic Paper, Peking University (July 1, 2013). 18 p. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2331225 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2331225

In the process of urbanization, China needs to expropriate more and more collective-owned lands in order to satisfy the need of city construction and development. However, when the collective-owned lands are expropriated currently, peasants get very low compensation for their loss in improvements, green crops, and land use rights.Why Chinese peasants get such a low compensation? From legal aspect, it is illegal for the Collective to sell its land directly in the market. China does not allow a market for the transfer of collective-owned land, the compensation lacks of a comparable market standard. In addition, the Land Administration Law requires the compensation to be based on the original purpose of land expropriated and administrative pricing. That leads the compensation standard to be far away from fair market value. From incentive aspect, the local government needs extra-budgetary revenue to fill the huge gap between its tax revenue and fiscal expenditure. The price spread between land-transferring fees and compensation turn into local government’s extra-budgetary revenue. Thus, the local government has great incentive to lower the compensation. With the discretion on deciding what qualifies public use, local government can expropriate as many collective-owned lands as possible, in order to generate more extra-budgetary revenue.

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Chen, Lei. Legal and institutional analysis of land expropriation in China (October 14, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2339998 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2339998

China has a bifurcated land system, with clear distinctions between urban and rural land use rights. While state-owned land in urban areas has become commercially transferable, rural land cannot be transferred. This discrepancy has been exploited by property developers, investors, village heads and local governments, which has caused wide-spread, large-scale malpractice in relation to expropriation of land. Thus, conflict over expropriation of land has been, and continues to be, a simmering hotpot of social unrest in China. It has been claimed that land disputes over expropriation is one of the most common ways of provoking grassroots resistance and undermining public confidence in the government. How should the grievances suffered by the rural farmers be redressed, and how should the Chinese government draw the fine line between economic development and individual property rights? In order to answer these questions, this paper addresses the root causes of land disputes both from a legal perspective, evaluating the most recent statutory changes, and from the policy perspective, analyzing the national strategy of integrating urban and rural areas (城乡一体化), including the recent local experiments on transforming the inalienability of rural land use rights.

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See also

Roberts, Dexter (November 20, 2013). Is land reform finally coming to China? Bloomberg Businessweek. Retrieved 10 February 2014 from http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-11-20/is-land-reform-finally-coming-to-china

China’s leaders raised a multitude of reforms as priorities at the plenum that closed a week ago. A key one, a change in land ownership so that farmers can more freely rent, sell, and mortgage their land, is hoped to boost China’s still laggard household consumption.

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Sargeson, Sally (2012). Villains, victims and aspiring proprietors : framing ‘land-losing villagers’ in China’s strategies of accumulation. Journal of Contemporary China, 21 (77),  757-777. DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2012.684962

This paper examines how debates in the media are providing the discursive conditions for, and thereby giving impetus to, diverse strategies of ‘so-called primitive accumulation’ in China. Taking as its empirical referent Chinese news and journal articles on land enclosure, the paper analyzes three frames in which policy entrepreneurs craft varying class positions for land-losing villagers. Grounded in different ontological premises, problem diagnoses and recommendations centering on the adoption of either a statist, neo-collective or liberal rural land regime, and backed up by evaluations of local policy experiments, the frames illustrate the diversity of ideational, political and institutional configurations that could facilitate the separation of peasant producers from the land, place land-losing villagers in different relationships with the state and capital, and sustain accumulation. In foregrounding these debates over land-losing villagers’ future class positioning, the paper aims to offer a corrective to the historical determinism implicit in contemporary analyses that characterize enclosure in China as simply one national manifestation of homogenous, global neo-liberal projects of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ or ‘gangster capitalism’.

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Monique Abud

Centre d’études sur la Chine moderne et contemporaine, EHESS, Paris, France

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高富平教授谈城乡一体化及农村集体经济的转型问题

2008年10月12日中共十七届中央委员会第三次全体会议通过《中共中央关于推进农村改革发展若干重大问题的决定》(下简称《决定》)。该《决定》的目的是进一步推进城乡一体化的落实,促进承包经营权流转(通过转让,出租,转包,互换,股份合作等形式)。但是农民对于土地流转的需求和渴望并没有学者和政策制定者期望的那么大。主要原因之一是现行体制下的土地承包经营权仍然是集体成员享有的权利,具有保障本村成员生存发展权利的社会保障功能。2012年12月在中央农村工作会议上,国家为了提高该《决定》的效果及加快城市化的进度要提出改革户籍制度。但改变现行户籍制度的具体方案还没公布。

最后,现行法律规定,流转承包经营权30年不变,即所谓的“增人不增地,减人不减地”,遏制土地调整。但在国内很多地方无论农民还是地方政府都不支持该规定。30年不变的规定虽然可以确保集体农村之外的投资者能稳定享有承包经营权。但是在经济落后地区,土地还是农民的主要收入来源。所以,该规定可能不符合削弱土地生存保障的经济功能。

访问回复内容由高富平华东政法大学教授填写

您觉得为什么该《决定》到目前为止效果不好?另外,实际上该《决定》出台之前,农村很多地方已开始实施承包经营权的流转,和以前的状况相比,该《决定》有什么不一样?

承包经营权流转一直处于开放的状态,《决定》无非是再次强调或重复过去法律已经规定的规则。但是,土地承包经营权是否流转或流转量取决于承包经营权人的内在需求,仅仅政策允许是不大可能根本转变流转的规模。在我国看来,现在流转不大的主要原因有二:其一,承包经营权仍然被农民视为生存保障手段,在没有确定谋生手段和社会保障之前,让农民转让其承包经营权是不现实的。其二,承包经营权流转意味着农民生存方式改变,从过去依赖村集体分配土地生存转变为依赖社会就业或者其他营业,这意味着根本上改变过去因出生或取得社员资格就可以取得土地的制度,而让农民接受这样结果目前恐怕有障碍。实质上,因社员资格取得土地维系现行农村集体经济的主要途径,而流转意味着不再通过直接分配土地使用权而是经营土地的收益或其他集体经济收入的再分配来间接体现集体经济。这无疑是巨大的转变,不是所有的农村能够实现这样的转变。

为了使农民愿意换户籍,国家应建立什么样的社会保障来取代土地?如户籍制度的改变让农民得到城市居民社会保障这不会意味着传统农村集体经济的解构吗?当承包经营权的流转年限结束时,农村集体还遵守传统承包经营权——按家庭承包的制度吗?

户籍和土地权属是支撑城乡分割的两个根源,而城乡之间的最大差别在于人的生存方式和保障体系不完全一样。让农民以放弃户籍来迫使农民放弃土地的前提是:农民有一定独立生存能力(比如有就业能力,或者投资经营能力),同时还可以像市民那样享受社会保障。如果真正实现了这样的转变,农地应丧失了身份,农民也就转变为市民,农民与农民之间的经济“合作”完全是契约性质的或经济性质的。这意味着传统以土地为联结点的农村集体经济转变为以资本或财产为联结点的商业组织。其结果是传统农村集体经济的解体或转型。
承包经营权的流转仍然受承包经营权存续期限约束,这意味着承包到期,受让人或者转承包人的权利也到期,到期后土地应当回归到集体组织。此时,土地如何再次发包?我认为,此时土地应当按照契约发包,而不是按户或村民身份发包,否则就会再一次回复到老路上,永远走不出土地与农民身份相联结的死胡同,土地去身份,人口去身份的现代市场经济或契约社会就无从建立。

您认为“30年不变” 政策如何落实?能按地方的经济发展水平来区分两个速度的实施吗?

中国农村经济差别很大,我认为,下一步无论中央推行什么样的政策都应当是允许有选择的、多元化的、循序渐进的,而不是一刀切的。在实行承包经营制的时候,我们就犯了强力普遍推行承包制的错误。我们再次引导走向以契约为主导的新型农村经济时,我们就不能再重蹈覆辙。农村承包经营权期限的固定是与流转相配合的,而农村承包经营权的调整是与传统集体经济相契合的。虽然农村经济最终是走向契约经济,但是,一定要根据每个地区的经济发展水平,因地制宜地推进和发展,允许不同进度的推进。可以不只两个速度,还可以更多的速度。总之,差异化发展是必然选择。但这对政府政策的制定和贯彻提出了更高的要求。

  • 高富平教授近期出版书包括: 2011年«物权法讲义»。北京:法律出版社,其他有关高富平教授的著作请点击此连结

Miguel Elosua

Spanish qualified lawyer; PhD in Chinese Law. UrbaChina Research Officer. Has lived in China since 2006.

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