Category Archives: Financial issues

Interview with Professor Yang Maolin

访谈内容由杨茂林教授修改后刊出

您认为山西城镇化率背后的意义为何?31keblyke0

2012年,山西省城镇化率首次突破50%,达到51.26%。这表明,在全省常住人口中,居住在城镇区域的人口首次超过了居住在农村区域的人口。这个变化是个不小的进步,标志着山西省城镇化发展进入了一个新的阶段。但对山西城镇化发展而言,除了要顾及发展速度,还必须考虑和提高发展质量,我认为这是今后山西城镇化在新的发展阶段要解决的问题。因此,山西省城镇化的加速发展,不仅要体现规模扩大和速度增加,更要体现质量提升和内涵变化。这也是山西省实现转型跨越发展的基本要求。

目前中国城镇化的主要问题是在加快发展速度的同时,没有相应地提高城市化发展质量,城市发展在整体上并不均衡。比如,城镇人口户籍率就是一个问题,农民到了城市,第二代都出生在城市,实际上已成为城市的一部分,但其户口问题没有解决,没有均等地享受到城市化所带来的发展成果。更为严重的是,随着城市化发展,中国出现了许多社会问题,如城镇承载能力、社会保障、社会治理等,都有待于通过提升质量来解决。我认为,在城市化加速期这一阶段,还存在着发展不均衡、不协调、不完全的问题,“低水平城镇化”的特征还是很突出的。中央政府高度重视这些问题,今年准备召开的全国城镇化工作会议,就要围绕户籍制度改革、土地制度改革、人均建设用地等问题,出台规划纲要,制定配套措施。我相信,经过中央和地方政府的努力,这些问题会逐步解决的。

土地税务是地方政府的重要财政收入之一,2002年国土资源部规定以招标、拍卖或者挂牌方式出让国有土地使用权,此规定也使得房地产在竞价过程中价格飙涨,然而财政部在201110月公布了《地方政府自行发债试点办法》,其目的是要解决地方政府对于土地财政的依赖,您认为发债方式是否就能解决土地价格飙涨的问题地方发债是否减轻地方政府对于土地税务的依赖?

我觉得解决不了。因为形成地方政府土地财政的背景比较复杂,其中不合理的中央与地方的税入关系是一个重要因素。自1994年分税制后,中央与地方的财权和事权关系不匹配的情况日趋严重,地方政府可用财力严重不足。在税入少且不稳定而事务多且繁重的情况下,地方政府依靠增量土地来拓展财源,依靠土地出让金来满足财政需求就成为一个必然结果。比如,地方政府要搞基础设施建设,要提供公共服务,要达到政绩要求,都需要加大投入力度,都需要多方吸揽资金。在此过程中,出让国有土地使用权以及房地产开发等一系列环节就成为地方政府财政收入的重要的且普遍的途径。这也就是今天被称为地方政府土地财政的由来。据有关统计,到2010年,土地财政收入占地方财政收入的比重达到了68%。在这种财权与事权不一致的体制中,在这种严重的土地依赖的背景下,地方政府自行发债可以缓解地方政府的土地依赖程度,但无疑不会从根本上解决土地财政问题。

事实上,中央与地方财权与事权的调整已成为解决地方政府土地财政的基本途径。因此,必须抓住这个主要问题,全面推进财政体制改革,合理界定中央和地方的财权、事权范围,加大中央财政转移支付的力度。与此同时,还必须真正转变地方政府职能,全面调整地方经济结构。只有这样,才能从根本上解决土地财政问题。

工业化是城镇化中很重要的一部分,各地政府积极发展工业化来推动城市的经济成长,2010年成立的中原经济区是一个横跨河南、山东、山西、安徽不同省份的经济区,城镇化又与税务、行政管理等不同面向有关,就您看来,城市间的合作要如何在中原经济区实现有何问题与挑战?

中原经济区是以郑州都市区为核心、范围包括河南省18个市及山东、安徽、河北、山西12个市3个县区,除了山东属于东部地区,其他都是中部地区。就目前中原经济区发展现状来说,尚未形成省省合作的局面;但我认为,在该区域内,城市之间存在着巨大的合作空间,如河南省一些城市就与周边省份一些城市出现了互动合作的趋向。去年,我在郑州参加过一次研讨会,主要内容就是探讨河南省济源市与其相邻的山西省长治市、晋城市、运城市的合作问题。应该说,这些城市都在一小时高速公路圈内,在某些领域有较大的合作空间。比如在旅游产业方面,这些城市既在地理上毗邻,又在高速公路上互通,更有彼此之间在人文历史和民风民俗上的相关性,可以进行合作,通过整合四个城市的旅游景点、规划旅游线路、设计旅游通票、甚至生产旅游纪念品等方式,大力推动该地区的旅游经济。与此同时,这些城市也有产业互补的历史渊源,可以进一步挖掘和扩大。当然,城市之间的合作会受到各自所属行政管理的约束,但是我认为,只要相关方能在战略上找到共同利益,并通过市场方式推动合作,应该是大有作为的。因此,如何建立合作交流机制,如何建立产业互补对接通道,如何完善市场、加速推进区域内生产要素的合理、自由流动,就是摆在城市合作面前的重要问题。省与省之间的合作更应如此。

杨茂林教授相關书籍包括: « 建国后山西重大发展成就及其思考», «县级可持续政治发展研究»等,其他有关袁志刚教授的著作请点击此连结

 

 

Chi-Han Ai

Ph.D. candidate of EHESS ( École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris) focusing on regional economic development in China and Taiwan.

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Is China about to introduce a national carbon price?

Arup, Tom. (2013) Where there’s smoke there’s China. The Age World, 8 May (accessed 7 June 2013).

As a former top diplomat in Beijing, and after three decades of professional and personal engagement with the country, Professor Ross Garnaut is no stranger to China.

In January, the respected economist and former Labor climate policy tsar found himself in Beijing again, this time to open a workshop hosted in part by China’s powerful National Development and Reform Commission.

Gathered were a group of international policy wonks, including many Australians and local government officials. They met to discuss options for what some in the public debate deny is happening – the introduction of a national carbon price in China.

In just over a month China will begin a massive experiment in emissions trading when the first of seven regional pilot schemes kicks off (and which one day may develop into a national scheme).

The stakes are high. China emits one-quarter of the world’s greenhouse gases. It is easily the world’s largest consumer of coal. In 2011 it released an estimated 9.7 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide – more than the US and India combined.

In his speech Garnaut painted a cautious, but encouraging, picture of where China stands on climate change.

Read more here

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Monique Abud

Centre d'études sur la Chine moderne et contemporaine, EHESS, Paris, France

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Preventing China’s local government debt crisis

Construction of a high end residential project in Sanya, Goulard SébastienWhile Eurozone countries have been severely affected by the recession and some local governments are struggling with substantial debts1, we may well ask whether another debt crisis could occur in China. Several newspapers have supported this hypothesis. Last August, Jonathan Kaiman, of Foreign Policy,warned of a potential debt bomb2. Like Spain, China’s local governments have heavily invested in building new (extravagant) infrastructures. In many cases, however, these infrastructures have not fulfilled the cities’ needs, but rather reflected their visions of grandeur. Both in Europe and China, poor governance on the part of the urban authorities has been caused by shady financial deals. In China’s case, the systemic risks are limited, considering the country’s fiscal strengths, but this is, nevertheless, an issue that needs to be dealt with in the future.

In 2010, during China’s real estate bubble, Sarah Tong and Yao Jielu (East Asian Institute) wrote an interesting article describing the causes of China’s local government debts3.  According to the authors, Urban Development Investment Vehicles (UDIVs) were the main driving force behind local government debts. Because they were not allowed to issue bonds or directly borrows from banks, local governments set up municipal state-owned companies (UDIVs) in order to have access to bank loans. Thanks to the UDIVs, local governments could easily finance the necessary infrastructures for urban development. However, the authors point out several problems in local governments’ use of UDIV bank loans. They particularly blame the lack of transparency: the public do not have access to the projects’ objectives. UDIVs are poorly supervised and this leads to overlapping infrastructures. In addition, many UDIV loans depend on unreliable guarantees: local governments use land as collateral for loans, which can lead to defaults if there is a slowdown in real estate prices.

According to the authors, the central government partially succeeded in addressing this issue by recapitalising some banks, implementing new policies to restrict local government access to bank loans, and taking several measures to limit speculation.  However, these measures may not be sufficient. Two years after the publication of Tong and Yao’s article, the problem of Chinese local government debts is not fully resolved..  The central authorities first allowed local governments to issue bonds, but then restricted bond sales.  Local governments will not be allowed to sell bonds directly; the central government will sell them on their behalf4. This illustrates the central authorities’ fear that local government debts will increase.

To overcome the debt problem, China may still need to revise her tax policies. The limits of the 1994 tax reform are now apparent. Several simple tactics could be used:

  • First, cities should not rely only on industry and land sales as their main financial resources. New tools should be found to rebalance urban development.
  • Secondly, the central authorities should increase their control over local government projects. Independent agencies should be empowered to assess and check local government budgets and expenditures, so that public resources are used wisely.
  • Local government expenditures should be reduced and redirected to the areas where they are most needed (such as education and low income housing). 

 China is not Europe. Beijing enjoys strong economic growth. The central government’s public debts, although substantial, are still under control; and unlike European countries, public debts are owned by national, government owned banks.

  1. Zafra, I. (2012, December 20th)  La deuda valenciana se dispara a cotas históricas a pesar de la ola de recortes. El Pais. http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2012/12/24/valencia/1356365528_191495.html, accessed February 13th 2013 []
  2. Kaiman, J. (2012, August 13th) . China’s debt bomb. Foreign Policy. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/03/china_s_debt_bomb, accessed February 13th 2013 []
  3. Tong S. & Yao J. (2010). “China’s rising local government debts sparks concerns” East Asian policy, Volume 2, No. 4 http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/Vol2No4_SarahTong&YaoJielu.pdf, accessed February 14th 2013 []
  4. Bloomberg News (2012, June 26th), China scraps trial of local government bonds, studies risks. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-26/china-scraps-trial-of-local-government-bonds-studies-risks-1-.html, accessed February 13th 2013 []

Sebastien Goulard

Ph.D. in political science (EHESS, Paris); M.A. in social sciences (EHESS, Paris); M.A. in international relations (IRIS, Paris), B.A. (Hons) in international political studies (ESE - Nottingham Trent University)

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袁志刚教授谈中国城镇化问题

访问回复内容由袁志刚教授撰写

您认为城镇化是否能减低内部与东部省份间的差距? 中央政府如何减少城市间的相互竞争? 中央与地方政府如何打破在城镇化过程中对于土地的依赖?

目前中国的城市化对于改善区域的不平衡有较为积极的影响,若户籍制度和跨区域土地流转等要素市场改革能更深入推进的话,这种正面的影响将更为显著。
中国的本身的幅员辽阔,珠三角、长三角之间的禀赋也存在诸多差异,区域间直接的竞争关系不明显,竞争更多的存在于各区域的内部之间,如广州和深圳,这种竞争目前尚未有比较好的协调机制,在某种程度上造成了一些重复建设和资源错配的情况。
在中西部,部分县市存在着过度开发、超前开发的情况,短期而言,中央政府可以在资金供给和项目审批等方面进行调控;长期来说,改革现有的财税体制,扩大地方政府发债的权限,由市场来为基础建设投资指路,有助于从根本上解决这一问题。

您认为现阶段的保障房实施办法有何问题与挑战?

近期,北京、上海、广州等地所公布的保障房实施办法均表示将把非户籍人口纳入社会保障,但对于非户籍人口的申请条件往往较为苛刻,非户籍人员需要出具纳税证明、社保证明并满足工作达一定年限等准入条件。然而保障房面临更大的问题在于空间分布的不合理,最新的数据显示保障房新开工套数东中西部的比例为30:34:36,作为人口导入地的东部地区新建的保障房数量偏低。即便是针对户籍居民中的低收入人群,社会保障也还须面对信息不对称的问题,需要设计让人讲真话的机制。有时这种机制很冷酷,例如廉租房要建的很小很简陋,从而保证它落到真正需要帮助者手里。

您认为城中村的根本解决之道?

我国的“城中村”是在城市快速蔓延的过程中出现的——由于开发主体为了规避高拆迁成本而采取 “征地不征村”,造成“城市包围农村”。受城市化的增值效应带动,“城中村”中存在着活跃的农房租赁活动,低廉的租金吸引了大量贫困人群。村民的逐利意识更随之空前觉醒,对土地资源进行了掠夺性使用,对社区居住环境、卫生、治安带来极大负外部性,形成“城中村痼疾”。为贫困人口提供可负担的住房可以引流走部分城中村租客,但远不是根本解决之法。城中村问题的根源是极不稳定的土地产权关系——村民随时面临拆迁的可能,因此其行为有短期性的特点,对房屋或社区的投资严重不足。因此,根本解决之道是转变城中村土地性质和农民身份。结合城市土地利用升级的需要,城中村的“清理——重建”是一条路径,但是,城中村的推倒必须同时为其廉租屋功能寻找到替代实现之法,否则城市可能出现新的流动的贫民窟。而现阶段最重要的问题是,政府主导的廉租房体系还远未形成。

目前中国部分城市已开放申请城市户籍,但我们也可以观察到有些农民更改户籍的意愿不高,您如何看这个现象?

解放后建立起来的户籍制度的目的是固定人口、维持社会稳定,而改革开放三十年以来的城市化与市场化要求要素的流动性,因此产生了户籍制度改革的需求。但需要清楚的是,户籍制度改革是为人们提供选择权,而不是剥夺。户籍关联了本地福利和特权,所以人们的户籍落在哪里,是经过一番成本收益计算的。我们通常只看到由于城市财政压力过高而难以放开户籍制度,却忽视了农业户口也有附加值。一方面,农村集体成员权与保障挂钩,在当前土地制度下,农地承包权和宅基地使用权都有福利分配的性质;另一方面,农村集体成员权与其财产权利挂钩,一旦放弃农业户籍,就得放弃土地、房屋等财产,也得放弃获得集体经济组织分红的权利。所以很容易理解,某些农民亦不愿意放弃农村户籍。

袁志刚教授近期出版书籍包括: «城乡统筹劳动力市场建设与国家竞争力研究», «中国居民消费前沿问题研究» 等书,其他有关袁志刚教授的著作请点击此连结

 

Chi-Han Ai

Ph.D. candidate of EHESS ( École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris) focusing on regional economic development in China and Taiwan.

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Land rolling development in Shanghai

Throughout the process of urban development in China, land development is important because the government must use land to obtain financial support and to subsequently improve urban infrastructures. In most places in China there exists a dual system of land ownership between the city and the rural areas: state-owned land and collectively-owned land. This means that land in the cities is owned by the state, and land in the rural and suburban areas is owned by collectives. Therefore, when urban development reaches a certain level, and more land is required, the government first appropriates the collectively-owned land in the rural area and converts it into state owned land to be used for urban construction. More precisely, the government appropriates the collectively-owned land in the rural area and compensates the owners before converting the land into state owned land. Subsequently, the government launches the process of primary land development, which involves investing in the land and developing it before contracting this new urban land to developers. This is commonly known as changing “raw land” into “cultivated land”.1

Primary land development includes land acquisition, land consolidation, and land reserve. Land reserve means that the ownership of land collected by the government is stored in the land reserve centre. These three processes must satisfy the requirements of the indicators for municipal underground infrastructures, as well as the requirements of urban planning, in order to carry out demolition, land levelling, and construction of public facilities in order to meet the land transfer standards. The executive bodies in primary land development are the local gov ernment, or the companies designated by the local government, such as urban investment companies and land reserve institutions. When the process of primary land development is completed, raw land is changed into cultivated land, which can be traded at the land transaction centre. The government holds auctions where developers can bid on land. Since 1994, the Tax Sharing System has been applied to local finances. Because of the Tax Sharing System, the local government cannot receive tax compensation from the central government. Therefore, the local government attempts to raise land prices through auctions to acquire higher land revenue. From the perspective of land developers, it is now possible for them to gain profits from the development of the acquired land. Likewise, the government can use the funds collected through land auctions to improve urban infrastructures.

If we look at the models of land development for the four development zones of Jinqiao, Lujiazui, Waigaoqiao, and Zhangjiang, we see that Shanghai is different from other cities in China. The Pudong New Area government, rather than the Shanghai city government, is in charge of these development zones. Because the Pudong New Area government is responsible for promoting investment and setting up infrastructures with limited financial resources, the government has designed a special model to finance and build the development zones. This land development model is called the “land rolling development model”.

First of all, the Pudong New Area government evaluates the price of rural collectively-owned land, and then pays 30% of the estimated price as the “land pre-acquisition costs” to the rural collectively-owned land owner to convert the land into state-owned land. “Land pre-acquisition costs” convert the land ownership and the land management. Then, the Shanghai Municipal Finance Bureau sets up the Development Zone Company. The fund provided to the company is equal to the estimated price of the rural collectively-owned land. When the Development Zone Company receives the fund, it purchases the development zone land from the Land Authority of Shanghai and signs the land use contract, thus acquiring the right to use the land. Next, the land ownership and the land management are transferred to the Development Zone Company. In this process, the flow of capital between the government and the Development Zone Company is counterbalanced. The land is transferred to the Development Zone Company without payment. In addition, the Development Zone Company may mortgage the land in order to receive loans to be used for the construction of the development zone. With the land loan, the Development Zone Company will need to pay only 70% of the property price to procure full ownership of the land and to develop it.2

 

The above graph plotted by Chi-Han Ai shows the difference between land development models of most cities in China and that of Shanghai. Please click to zoom in the graph.

This “land rolling development model” enables the Pudong New Area government to raise funds and complete the infrastructure of the development zone. However, this model has some underlying problems. For example, the government focuses on land and real estate development, but neglects industrial development. For the development of the industrial zone, the links between Industrial organizations are an important factor. However, the Chinese government still has room for improvement regarding industrial connections.

  1. Zhu Lingyi (2004) Fuxian zhong di difang fazhan xing guojia? Taibei nèi hu keji yuanqu yu shanghai zhangjianggao keje yuanqu de bijiao yanjiu 浮现中的地方发展型国家? 台北内湖科技园区与上海张江高科技园区的比较研究。Master thesis, National Taiwan University, Taipei. []
  2. Shanghai shi difangzhi bangongshi 上海市地方志办公室, Retrieved from http://www.shtong.gov.cn/node2/node2245/node64514/node64522/node64575/node64585/userobject1ai58313.html , last accessed 04 December 2012. []

Chi-Han Ai

Ph.D. candidate of EHESS ( École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris) focusing on regional economic development in China and Taiwan.

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In rush to build, property stumbles

Last month, the New York Times published an article written by Bettina Wassener on China’s real estate sector. This article, entitled “ In Rush to Build, Property stumbles ”, points out the issues that China may face as a result of the “construction rush” and the fragility of the real estate sector; but unlike in her usual articles, this time the author has not adopted a dramatic note; she has put this real estate boom into perspective, and has formulated long term hypotheses.

According to Wassener, construction projects have been mushrooming all over China for the last five years, not only in great metropolises, but also in second tier cities. Construction and real estate have become major sectors of the Chinese economy. In order to avoid real estate speculation and bubble bursts, the central government launched several measures to cool down the market in 2010; consequently, real estate prices tended to slow down.  Although, these control measures were necessary, they may have had side effects on the overall economy. Wassener has noticed that the property sector varies greatly from one city to another: whereas demand for housing and office space is still high in large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, with no drop in prices, some of the smaller cities have begun to suffer from oversupply, causing real estate prices to decrease. All too often, construction projects in second tier cities fail to match the demand: priority has been given to eye-catching properties (described by Wassener as vainglorious projects) instead of affordable housing units. Because of housing restrictions, investment in construction projects has moved from top cities to provincial cities: but demand for luxurious housing units and CBDs is much lower there. Developers and local governments that have invested in such projects may shortly face financial weaknesses. Wassener stresses that for 2012 developers may suffer “ record-high debt maturing ”.

For the author, Beijing is trying to achieve equilibrium between developers who need to secure their investments, and the local population who can hardly afford to purchase property, due to high prices. Thus, real estate also influences social issues.

Construction in Kunming (China), Gipouloux François

Wassener has, however, raised an interesting issue by pointing out that China is a country undergoing a strong urbanisation movement. China is not Spain: there may be an oversupply in the housing market, especially in second tiers cities, but China’s  urbanisation process has not yet ended. More and more rural migrants will become urban dwellers in the next decades, and Beijing will “ undoubtedly implement measures to develop central China’s cities” .  For the author, the housing market may also benefit from the cultural trend in China that favors real estate ownership – the desire for home ownership seems to be more widespread in China than in Europe.The author has also succeeded in demonstrating that China is not undergoing a uniform urbanisation process:  differences still remain among Chinese cities and the construction market is not as mature in central China as it is in coastal China. This is also why it is important not to stereotype Chinese cities, a rule which we, at UrbaChina, must strictly follow.

We regret that the author has not examined the shady connections between real estate developers and local governments. Many large real estate projects have been ordered by local governments, who in turn may have to face financial issues in case of oversupply.  This may ignite social protests among the locals. When local governments own housing developments, we may well wonder if conflicts of interests are not involved.

The phenomenon of oversupply in housing described in this article may also result from bad planning on the part of the local authorities.  They may not have been able to foresee the urban trends in their cities, or they may have favoured construction as an important short term financial resource. In some cities, construction oversupply may partly result from the fiscal policy adopted by Chinese local governments.

 

 

Sebastien Goulard

Ph.D. in political science (EHESS, Paris); M.A. in social sciences (EHESS, Paris); M.A. in international relations (IRIS, Paris), B.A. (Hons) in international political studies (ESE - Nottingham Trent University)

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